South Ossetia: An election for?

One would not think that a country with a population of around 70,000 people would cause much of an international fuss. Yet, South Ossetia, a Russian-occupied Georgian enclave held its third Presidential election within five months yesterday, with ex-KGB chief Leonid Tibilov declared as the winner after taking 54 per cent of the poll in a run-off.

Situated in the historically troubled Northern Caucasus, South Ossetia has long declared a battle of independence to unify itself with its northern neighbour, North Ossetia. Yet the events of history have seen the Ossetian people stranded in one of the regions ‘frozen conflicts’.

It is worth knowing that Ossetians speak their own language and were one of the many different ethnic groups that made up the former Soviet Union. Despite the great cultural and political links between Georgia and South Ossetia, the calls for reunification have always been strong. The South Ossetian Popular Front declared independence in 1990 resulting in a minor conflict lasting until 1992. More recently, the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, which overshadowed the Beijing Olympics, saw the futures of Abkhazia and South Ossetia again come into question.

The political deadlock since 2008 has caused difficulties both regionally and globally. Georgia, an ally of the West and a ‘promised’ future member of NATO believes that the elections will lead to puppet regimes of Russia, as well as denying suffrage to Georgians expelled from the region. Whereas Russia, particularly President-elect Vladimir Putin, believes it is in his country’s interest to look after its so-called ‘near abroad’.

The first poll in November was annulled after Russia’s preferred candidate lost unexpectedly to an anti-corruption campaigner. Since 2008, Russia has kept troops in the region, whilst pumping in hundreds of millions of dollars in aid. It is one of only five nations to have recognised South Ossetia as independent along with: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu.

The election does raise many questions; most profoundly about how do countries get independence and the goals of Russian foreign policy. These countries were all formerly members of the USSR and since the break up, many have become independent and more worryingly to Moscow, have looked to the EU and NATO for support. Chechnya and Dagestan have both fought bitter insurgencies against Russian troops since the early 1990s; it is only through the Kremlin’s recognition of strongmen in charge, normally in return for aid and weapons, plus a blind eye to the abuse of democracy that it has been able to retain its sphere of influence. Belarus’s Alexander Lukashenko, Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych and Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov all curry favour and influence with Putin and Medvedev. It is a question of whether Russia acts as neutral peacemakers or conniving troublemakers in the region.

For South Ossetians, how much will their lives change? As liberating as it was for the likes of Poland or Lithuania? Or marginalised like Kosovo or Moldova? Independence is not only a struggle for democracy, but also recognition. South Ossetia may become independent and then unified or possibly rejoin Russia, but what then does that mean for its people?   

The EU: Ode to joy or not?

The internal strife emanating throughout Europe is transforming the union into a concord of disharmony. In streets and city squares, hoards of protesters commune to aim their vitriol at lacklustre governments and impugned banks. The years of cheap credit and profligacy have returned to haunt many nations as their debt-ridden treasuries have been forced to implement austerity measures in return for financial bailouts. In Madrid, protesters known as los indignados (meaning ‘the outraged’) have occupied the Puerta del Sol, rejecting the punishing measures accepted by its government. Meanwhile in Athens, Syntagma Square has seen months of violent clashes between riot police and demonstrators, as the Greek government implemented tough austerity measures in return for EU loans. Dublin, Lisbon, London and Rome have also seen a surge in protests and occupy movements, all in reaction to the prospect of cuts to welfare and an unreformed financial sector. What is most noticeable about the swelling in anger is the increasing distrust and hostility between nations. Germany, the central political and economic power is increasingly being slurred with Nazi characterisations, as it forces the ‘feckless’ Greeks to accept the tranches of bailout money. The open antagonism between the prudent Northern Europeans and their reckless Southern cousins is opening tensions to the sustainability of the whole fiscal and political union.

Yet as the continuous infighting continues, many of Europe’s other countries are beginning to lose sight of the European dream. Welcomed in from beyond the frosty realms of the Iron Curtain, Eastern Europe is discovering that the party they thought that was inviting is not as welcoming as they previously thought.

Many policy chiefs in the corridors of power of Brussels believed that a larger political union would create a stronger economic union. To an extent they were correct; here was the world’s largest and most successful internal market. All countries from the Eastern bloc yearned to join; even some North African countries sought membership. The European Union had the benefits of close political and defensive ties with America, multilateralism and a form of welfare capitalism. How the tides of fortune have ebbed away.

Countries that EU technocrats may have one day expected to join are weighing up their options. Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan resent Europe’s hesitancy and hypocrisy. In fact, the West’s biggest proponent in the former Soviet bloc, President Saakashvili of Georgia, could flout the constitutional rules and run again for Presidency in 2013. Why should any of these countries listen to hedonistic messages of prudence when the European Central Bank is printing money to buy debt from its own shambolic economies? Even Hungary, an EU member, is flouting union rules over budget-deficit targets and media freedom. Turkey appeared to go cold over Europe many years ago. Russia is happy to see former satellite states return to the fold.

What about that great American hope? The US was once the Baltic States biggest and most loyal admirer. Countries like Poland were steadfast in their support of NATO and happy to commit men on the ground in war zones. Not to mention America’s new missile defence shield, to the chagrin of Russia. Yet, American foreign policy is heading west once again. The geopolitical and economic shift to Asia is seeing American strategy head towards the Pacific and the emerging markets. No longer is Europe the primary frontier. Obama’s decision to abandon the shield and along with the EU’s inexistent foreign policy is turning the once idealistic Poles and Czechs into hardnosed endorsers of Realpolitik.

The EU’s decision to prevent the Euro from failing will see a new era of internal relations. Closer fiscal relationships will only mean tougher stances on imprudence. The collective voices of the right in Northern Europe will no longer tolerate the spending cultures of countries like Italy and Greece. EU expansion will certainly be welcoming to countries of the Balkans but it might not be as jovial as they thought.