South Ossetia: An election for?

One would not think that a country with a population of around 70,000 people would cause much of an international fuss. Yet, South Ossetia, a Russian-occupied Georgian enclave held its third Presidential election within five months yesterday, with ex-KGB chief Leonid Tibilov declared as the winner after taking 54 per cent of the poll in a run-off.

Situated in the historically troubled Northern Caucasus, South Ossetia has long declared a battle of independence to unify itself with its northern neighbour, North Ossetia. Yet the events of history have seen the Ossetian people stranded in one of the regions ‘frozen conflicts’.

It is worth knowing that Ossetians speak their own language and were one of the many different ethnic groups that made up the former Soviet Union. Despite the great cultural and political links between Georgia and South Ossetia, the calls for reunification have always been strong. The South Ossetian Popular Front declared independence in 1990 resulting in a minor conflict lasting until 1992. More recently, the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, which overshadowed the Beijing Olympics, saw the futures of Abkhazia and South Ossetia again come into question.

The political deadlock since 2008 has caused difficulties both regionally and globally. Georgia, an ally of the West and a ‘promised’ future member of NATO believes that the elections will lead to puppet regimes of Russia, as well as denying suffrage to Georgians expelled from the region. Whereas Russia, particularly President-elect Vladimir Putin, believes it is in his country’s interest to look after its so-called ‘near abroad’.

The first poll in November was annulled after Russia’s preferred candidate lost unexpectedly to an anti-corruption campaigner. Since 2008, Russia has kept troops in the region, whilst pumping in hundreds of millions of dollars in aid. It is one of only five nations to have recognised South Ossetia as independent along with: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu.

The election does raise many questions; most profoundly about how do countries get independence and the goals of Russian foreign policy. These countries were all formerly members of the USSR and since the break up, many have become independent and more worryingly to Moscow, have looked to the EU and NATO for support. Chechnya and Dagestan have both fought bitter insurgencies against Russian troops since the early 1990s; it is only through the Kremlin’s recognition of strongmen in charge, normally in return for aid and weapons, plus a blind eye to the abuse of democracy that it has been able to retain its sphere of influence. Belarus’s Alexander Lukashenko, Ukraine’s Viktor Yanukovych and Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov all curry favour and influence with Putin and Medvedev. It is a question of whether Russia acts as neutral peacemakers or conniving troublemakers in the region.

For South Ossetians, how much will their lives change? As liberating as it was for the likes of Poland or Lithuania? Or marginalised like Kosovo or Moldova? Independence is not only a struggle for democracy, but also recognition. South Ossetia may become independent and then unified or possibly rejoin Russia, but what then does that mean for its people?