As politicians from around Europe try to work out how to sort out the Greek financial crisis and the potential domino-effect across Southern European nations, the prospects for a generation of young Europeans does not look prosperous in terms of employment or financial stability. One of the main issues that economists and political commentators have pointed out was the fact that the creation of the Euro was built on a premise of political union and advancement, without the framework of a single European economic policy. However, politicians and people from across mainland Europe, despite the uncertainty, have been pursuing such a goal for the past 60 years. The rebuilding of Europe after World War 2 was both cosmetic and political. It provided a framework to pursue peace and a bulwark against Soviet Russia in the East. Even after the Berlin Wall came down twenty years ago, politicians including British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the French President Francois Mitterrand believed a reunited Germany could spell danger for the future of Europe. The whole purpose of European unity was to keep Germany down and central to its future, something it was battling against seventy years ago to this day.
If one battle is to define World War Two then it must be Operation Barbarossa. Launched with five of Hitler’s armies across the Eastern European frontier it set out to destroy Bolshevik Russia and to expand Germany into the distant East. Eventually five million German soldiers would die to fighting, the cruel Russian winter or disappear in to the work camps in the Arctic North. Russia’s gamble saw it lose over 27 million of its population, two thirds of them being civilians. Yet, despite the tremendous human loss, it is defined by historians as a battle won and lost through the eyes of Hitler and Stalin. These men were caustic and murderously driven to victory, yet they saw the battle as a chance to amend the wrongs of history and to place themselves within the annals of military legend.
Hitler’s hate and scorn for communists and the Slavic race is well documented yet during the infamous pact signed by von Ribbentrop and Molotov that sliced up the Poland and Lithuania between Russia and Germany, Stalin believed Hitler would keep his word and refrain from invasion. Yet Operation Barbarossa, named after King Frederick I of the Holy Roman Empire who set out to conquer the Holy Land in the twelfth century was deemed by Hitler to be a befitting name. On 22 June 1941 when Hitler’s tanks and troops crossed the Russian border, Stalin could not believe it. Despite intelligence from Soviet spies within Germany and on the border he chose to ignore it. Stalin was more sceptical of the British, who were relaying the same information, than his German counterparts (Britain had been Russia’s long term rival in the nineteenth century and had intervened against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War). In the first day two thirds of the Russian air force was destroyed.
Hitler’s Blitzkrieg, the lightning war that walked over Western Europe, captured Minsk, Kiev, encircled Leningrad and came within 18 miles of Moscow was flawed from the start and any essence of military history could have told Hitler this. Napoleon’s epic battles against the Russia in 1812 are best captured in Tolstoy’s ‘War and Peace’ where the French are eventually pushed out by a disorganised Russian force. Hitler was obsessed with postcard captures rather than strategic victories. He was blinded by the fog of war and the abstractions of history that had eluded German and Prussians in the past. Like Napoleon, Hitler’s lines were stretched to the limit across a continental front. He ignored the cries from his Generals and believed he knew best. Blitzkrieg had worked but the front line still needed to be supplied.
Stalin too was also blinded by foolishness. His ignorance over intelligence and disastrous attempts to advance was an opportunity to replicate the successes of the 1812 General Kutuzov. At one stage, Stalin believed that his costly decisions would see him ousted, yet the reality as Professor Robert Service points out; he had imprisoned and killed all potential rivals – he was the only one left. He was asked to take the battle to the Nazis
While Hitler continuously gambled, Stalin used history to prevail. Like 1812, he saw this as the ‘Great Patriotic War’. He stayed in Moscow, unlike in 1812 and coordinated the battle from the Politburo in the Kremlin. He allowed generals to make decisions and employed effective propaganda to cede attempts to capture Stalingrad. Leningrad survived the Nazi siege for over 900 days. Armed by the allies, Russia was able to push back the Nazis, war weary and frozen (like Napoleon’s men) to his new prize, Berlin. After years of struggle, this was an opportunity to recapture and to take revenge, through any circumstance necessary.
During those three and half years, Eastern Europe became the blood lands of a violent and ideological war. It was rape, genocide and conflagration on an enormous scale, destroying and poisoning Europe for the following fifty years. Over 2.5 million people died in Stalingrad alone. It is easy to say that times are tough, but Europe has seen much worse.
If one battle is to define World War Two then it must be Operation Barbarossa. Launched with five of Hitler’s armies across the Eastern European frontier it set out to destroy Bolshevik Russia and to expand Germany into the distant East. Eventually five million German soldiers would die to fighting, the cruel Russian winter or disappear in to the work camps in the Arctic North. Russia’s gamble saw it lose over 27 million of its population, two thirds of them being civilians. Yet, despite the tremendous human loss, it is defined by historians as a battle won and lost through the eyes of Hitler and Stalin. These men were caustic and murderously driven to victory, yet they saw the battle as a chance to amend the wrongs of history and to place themselves within the annals of military legend.
Hitler’s hate and scorn for communists and the Slavic race is well documented yet during the infamous pact signed by von Ribbentrop and Molotov that sliced up the Poland and Lithuania between Russia and Germany, Stalin believed Hitler would keep his word and refrain from invasion. Yet Operation Barbarossa, named after King Frederick I of the Holy Roman Empire who set out to conquer the Holy Land in the twelfth century was deemed by Hitler to be a befitting name. On 22 June 1941 when Hitler’s tanks and troops crossed the Russian border, Stalin could not believe it. Despite intelligence from Soviet spies within Germany and on the border he chose to ignore it. Stalin was more sceptical of the British, who were relaying the same information, than his German counterparts (Britain had been Russia’s long term rival in the nineteenth century and had intervened against the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War). In the first day two thirds of the Russian air force was destroyed.
Hitler’s Blitzkrieg, the lightning war that walked over Western Europe, captured Minsk, Kiev, encircled Leningrad and came within 18 miles of Moscow was flawed from the start and any essence of military history could have told Hitler this. Napoleon’s epic battles against the Russia in 1812 are best captured in Tolstoy’s ‘War and Peace’ where the French are eventually pushed out by a disorganised Russian force. Hitler was obsessed with postcard captures rather than strategic victories. He was blinded by the fog of war and the abstractions of history that had eluded German and Prussians in the past. Like Napoleon, Hitler’s lines were stretched to the limit across a continental front. He ignored the cries from his Generals and believed he knew best. Blitzkrieg had worked but the front line still needed to be supplied.
Stalin too was also blinded by foolishness. His ignorance over intelligence and disastrous attempts to advance was an opportunity to replicate the successes of the 1812 General Kutuzov. At one stage, Stalin believed that his costly decisions would see him ousted, yet the reality as Professor Robert Service points out; he had imprisoned and killed all potential rivals – he was the only one left. He was asked to take the battle to the Nazis
While Hitler continuously gambled, Stalin used history to prevail. Like 1812, he saw this as the ‘Great Patriotic War’. He stayed in Moscow, unlike in 1812 and coordinated the battle from the Politburo in the Kremlin. He allowed generals to make decisions and employed effective propaganda to cede attempts to capture Stalingrad. Leningrad survived the Nazi siege for over 900 days. Armed by the allies, Russia was able to push back the Nazis, war weary and frozen (like Napoleon’s men) to his new prize, Berlin. After years of struggle, this was an opportunity to recapture and to take revenge, through any circumstance necessary.
During those three and half years, Eastern Europe became the blood lands of a violent and ideological war. It was rape, genocide and conflagration on an enormous scale, destroying and poisoning Europe for the following fifty years. Over 2.5 million people died in Stalingrad alone. It is easy to say that times are tough, but Europe has seen much worse.
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